Addressing privacy issues in CardSpace by Alrodhan, Waleed & Mitchell, Chris J
Addressing privacy issues in CardSpace
Waleed A. Alrodhan and Chris J. Mitchell
Royal Holloway, University of London,
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom
{W.A.Alrodhan, C.Mitchell}@rhul.ac.uk
Abstract
CardSpace (formerly known as InfoCard) is a Digital
Identity Management system that has recently been adopted
by Microsoft. In this paper we identify two security flaws
in CardSpace that may lead to a serious privacy violation.
The first flaw is the reliance on Internet user judgements
of the trustworthiness of service providers, and the second
is the reliance of the system on a single layer of authen-
tication. We also propose a solution designed to address
both flaws. Our solution is compatible with the currently
deployed CardSpace identity metasystem, and should en-
hance the privacy of the system with minor changes to the
current CardSpace framework. We also provide a security
and performance analysis of the proposed solution.
1 Introduction
Along with the growing reliance on Internet web appli-
cations in our daily life, comes the problem of managing the
necessary digital identities and preserving their privacy. In
an open large-scale domain such as the Internet, preserving
user privacy is not a straightforward task. Identity theft,
which occurs when an impostor uses a legitimate user’s
identifying information without his/her consent, is becom-
ing one of the biggest concerns for organisations offering
services on the Internet.
Many solutions have been proposed in the last few years
to address the threat of identity theft, and to tackle identity-
oriented attacks such as phishing and pharming. Most of
those solutions are based on the concept of Identity Feder-
ation (different identities that belong to the same user in a
particular trust domain are “federated”), and Single Sign-On
(where a user performs an authentication process only once
in a single working session).
Recently, Microsoft has proposed a new identity man-
agement framework named CardSpace. CardSpace has
some similarities to other identity federation systems; how-
ever it is not a single sign-on system. CardSpace is designed
to reduce the reliance on passwords for Internet user authen-
tication by service providers, and to improve the privacy of
personal information.
In this paper we identify significant security and privacy
issues in the CardSpace scheme. We focus on two partic-
ular security problems, namely the reliance by the system
on Internet user judgements of the trustworthiness of ser-
vice providers, and the dependency on a single layer of user
authentication with the Identity Provider. In this paper we
propose a solution for these two problems, using the con-
cept of Secured from Identity Theft (SIT) attributes [2], and
zero-knowledge cryptographic techniques.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In
section 2 we provide a brief overview of the CardSpace
framework. In section 3 we describe two security flaws in
CardSpace. In section 4 we propose a solution for the se-
curity problems discussed in section 3, and in section 5 a
security and performance analysis of the proposed solution
is given. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Microsoft CardSpace
In this section we provide a brief overview of CardSpace.
We then describe the CardSpace framework and message
flow.
2.1 An Overview
CardSpace is the name for a Microsoft WinFX set of
software components that form an identity management
system or an identity metasystem, since it is a system of
systems. This identity metasystem is designed to comply
with the Laws of Identity promulgated by Microsoft1.
Digital identities in CardSpace are represented as claims
made by one digital subject (e.g. an Internet user) about
itself or another digital subject. A claim is an assertion
that certain identifying information (e.g. given name, SSN,
credit card number, etc.) belongs to a given digital subject
[3]. According to this definition, identifiers (e.g. username)
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and attributes (e.g. user gender) are both treated as claims
within the identity metasystem.
CardSpace can be integrated with Microsoft Windows
XP and Internet Explorer version 7 (a toolkit is freely avail-
able from Microsoft), and has been distributed with Win-
dows Vista. Since CardSpace is an “open” XML-based
framework, CardSpace plug-ins for browsers other than Mi-
crosoft Internet Explorer can also be developed, such as the
Firefox Plug-in.2
2.2 The CardSpace Framework
The CardSpace framework is based on the identification
process we experience in the real world using physical iden-
tification cards. Within the CardSpace framework, an iden-
tity provider issues Internet users with virtual cards called
InfoCards, that hold non-sensitive meta-information related
to them. Subsequently, the Internet users can use their In-
foCards to identify themselves to any service provider (or
relying party) who trusts the identity provider that issued
the InfoCards. InfoCards can also be self-issued by the In-
ternet users themselves.
Figure 1. CardSpace Framework.
Figure 2 provides a simplified sketch of the CardSpace
framework. In the figure it is assumed that the user has
already been issued an InfoCard by the identity provider
(henceforth abbreviated to IdP). In step 1, the CardSpace-
enabled user agent or the Service Requestor (henceforth
abbreviated to CEUA), which is essentially a CardSpace-
enabled web browser, requests a service from the relying
party or service provider (henceforth abbreviated to RP).
In step 2, the RP identifies itself using a public key certifi-
cate (e.g. a certificate used for SSL/TLS), and declares itself
as a CardSpace-enabled RP using XHTML code or HTML
1http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/netframework/aa663320.aspx
2http://xmldap.blogspot.com/2006/05/firefox-identity-selector.html
object tags. After recognising that the RP is CardSpace-
enabled, the CEUA retrieves the RP security policy in step
3. This policy contains a list of the claims that must be
asserted about the Internet user (henceforth abbreviated to
user) in order for this user to be granted the service, the
IdPs that are trusted to make such assertions, and the types
of security token holding the assertions that are acceptable
to the RP. The security policy also specifies requirements
that must be met by the retrieved security token (e.g. the
type of proof key and the maximum token age). It is impor-
tant to emphasise here that CardSpace identity metasystem
does not demand specific types of tokens; any token type
can be used within the framework.
In step 4 the CEUA matches the RP’s security policy
with the InfoCards possessed by the user, in order to find
an InfoCard that satisfies the RP’s policy. If one or more
suitable InfoCards are found, the user is prompted to select
an InfoCard from amongst them. After the user has selected
an InfoCard, the CEUA initiates a connection with the IdP
that issued that InfoCard. The user performs an authentica-
tion process with the IdP in step 5.
If the authentication process succeeds, step 6 takes place,
in which the CEUA requests the IdP to provide a security
token that holds an assertion of the truth of the claims listed
within the selected InfoCard; the message that holds this
request is called a request security token (or RST) message.
The IdP will then check whether its security policy permits
it to generate the requested security token. If so, the IdP will
reply by sending a security token within a message called
a request security token response (or RSTR). Finally, the
CEUA forwards the security token to the RP in step 7, and,
if the RP verifies it successfully, the service will be granted
in step 8.
It is worth mentioning here that, after step 6, the security
token can be optionally displayed to the user before pro-
ceeding to step 7. Moreover, the RP will get an assertion
from the IdP that the security token received was issued to
a particular user. This assertion is based on the concept of
“proof-key” where the user proves that she/he is in posses-
sion of the proof-key held in the security token. This asser-
tion helps to prevent token replay attacks.
The Security Token Service (henceforth abbreviated to
STS) is a software component of the CardSpace identity
metasystem, responsible for security policy and token man-
agement within the IdP (and optionally within the RP).
The CardSpace identity metasystem makes use of XML-
based protocols, including the Web Services (WS-*) proto-
cols and SOAP. Most of these protocols require the RP to
have an STS server in order to process the messages [1, 9].
The message flows of the CardSpace framework are as fol-
lows:
1. CEUA→ RP : HTTP GET Login HTML Page Request
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2. RP → CEUA : HTML Login Page + InfoCard Tags
(XHTML or HTML object tags)
3. CEUA ↔ RP : CEUA retrieves security policy via WS-
SecurityPolicy
4. CEUA↔ User : User picks an InfoCard
5. CEUA↔ IdP : User Authentication
6. CEUA ↔ IdP : CEUA retrieves security token via WS-
MetadataExchange and WS-Trust
7. CEUA→ RP : CEUA presents the security token viaWS-
Trust
8. RP→ CEUA : Welcome, you are now logged in!
WS-MetadataExchange [4], WS-Trust [6] and WS-
SecurityPolicy [7] messages are transported over SOAP.
Messages in steps 3, 5, 6 and 7 must be carried over an
SSL/TLS channel to preserve their confidentiality. If the RP
does not have an STS server, the messages in steps 3 and
7 will be carried using HTTP over an SSL/TLS channel.
It appears reasonable to assume that the most commonly
used security token type is a SAML assertion, carried over
SOAP. Integrity of the security token is preserved using an
XML-Signature as part of the WS-Security [9] protocol.
3 Security Limitations of the CardSpace
Framework
We next discuss certain security limitations of the
CardSpace framework. CardSpace suffers from a number of
such limitations, such as its reliance on DNS names to iden-
tify the IdPs and the RPs. If the DNS server is controlled
by an attacker, it can direct the identity metasystem par-
ties to false websites. This problem is common to most of
the current Internet identity management solutions. Another
limitation is that, in the default scenario for the CardSpace
framework, the IdP is aware of the identities of the RPs to
which the user attempts to log in. Accordingly, the IdP can
learn about the behaviour of users on the web. Although
there is an alternative scenario, we believe that this is a po-
tentially serious privacy violation.
In the remainder of this section we focus on two particu-
lar security limitations of the CardSpace framework which
we believe are most significant, namely: the reliance on the
user’s judgement of the trustworthiness of the RP, and the
reliance on a single layer of authentication.
3.1 Judgements of RP Trustworthiness
The user judgement regarding the honesty of the RP is a
security-critical task, as stated earlier in this paper. As de-
scribed in section 2.2, the RP will obtain personal informa-
tion belonging to the user in the form of “asserted claims”
within a security token, as sent in step 7 of the message
flow. That means that, if the RP is not trustworthy, it could
gather information about users and potentially use this in
unauthorised ways. Accordingly, any misjudgement of the
trustworthiness of an RP could result in a serious privacy
violation. Hence, the task of judging the honesty of the RP
is a very important one.
Within the deployed CardSpace framework, as described
in section 2.2, when the user is prompted for its consent to
be authenticated to an RP using a particular InfoCard, the
user makes a judgement regarding the trustworthiness of the
RP based on one of:
1. A high-assurance public key certificate belonging to
the RP,
2. An “ordinary” public key certificate belonging to the
RP (e.g. a certificate used for SSL/TLS), or
3. No certificate at all [3].
Microsoft recommends the first option, i.e. the use of
a high assurance certificate (also referred to as a “higher-
value” or “higher-assurance” certificate). Such a certifi-
cate is an X.509 certificate that is only issued after a rig-
orous and well-defined registration process, unlike the CA-
specific procedures used for issuing certificates commonly
employed as the basis for SSL/TLS security. A high as-
surance certificate includes a digitally signed bitmap of the
RP’s company logo, in order to make it easier for the user
to identify the certificate holder.
In general, it would appear that an user is not qualified
to make such a security critical decision. Most users do not
pay much attention when they are asked to approve a digital
certificate, either because they do not understand the impor-
tance of the approval decision, or because they know that
they must approve the certificate in order to get access to
a particular website. RPs with no certificates can be used
in the CardSpace framework (given user consent), and this
leads to a serious risk of a privacy violation. If we consider
the potentially massive number of RPs, it is likely that (at
least initially) many of them will not possess a high assur-
ance certificate. Even in the case where an RP does have
a high assurance certificate, the user may be deceived by a
company name or logo that is similar to that used by a le-
gitimate RP (although in principle this should be prevented
by the registration process for a high assurance certificate).
It is important to emphasise that this problem is less
critical in other deployed identity management frameworks
such as the Liberty Alliance Project3 and OpenID4. In the
Liberty Alliance framework, no personal information is re-
vealed to the service provider (or the RP); the RP gets only
an assertion from the IdP that a particular user has been
authenticated using a specific authentication method. The
only framework-related problem arising from trusting an
imposter RP within the Liberty Alliance framework would
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be revealing information about the existence of a relation-
ship between an user and a certain IdP [11].
3.2 Reliance on a Single Layer of Authen-
tication
As discussed in section 2, the security of the CardSpace
identity metasystem relies on the authentication of the user
by the IdP. In a case where a single IdP and multiple RPs
are involved in a single working session, which we expect
to be a typical scenario, the security of the identity meta-
system within that working session will rely on a single
layer of authentication. This user authentication can be
achieved in several ways (e.g. using an X.509 certificate,
Kerberos v5 ticket, self-issued token or password); how-
ever, it seems likely that, in the majority of cases, a simple
username/password authentication technique will be used.
If a working session is hijacked (e.g. by compromising
a self-issued token), or the password is cracked (e.g. via
guessing, brute-force, key logging, or dictionary attacks),
the security of the whole system will be compromised. It is
fair to mention here that most of the deployed Internet iden-
tity management solutions, such as Liberty and OpenID,
suffer from the same vulnerability.
4 Improving the Security of CardSpace
Our proposed solution is based on the concept of Se-
cured from Identity Theft (SIT) attributes [2], which is
based on Schnorr’s zero-knowledge protocol [5, 10]. We
treat the claims within the CardSpace framework as SIT at-
tributes. The goal of the solution is to prevent the need to
reveal the actual values of the claims to any party within the
CardSpace framework. This means that no party will have
to trust any other party to the level that it has to reveal the
actual values of the claims to it.
In our proposed solution, instead of including the ac-
tual value of the claim in the security token in step 6 of
the message flow illustrated in section 2.2, the IdP will in-
clude data computed using the actual value of the claim. It
must not be feasible for the RP to deduce the value of the
actual claim using only this data. It merits mentioning here
that the structure and the content of the security token will
remain the same (e.g. time-stamps, pseudonyms, signature
values, etc.), except the part that includes the actual value
of the claim.
4.1 Protocol Requirements
Prior to use of the protocol, the Identity Provider must
select three domain parameters, p, q and g, where p and q
2http://www.projectliberty.org
3http://www.openid.net
are large primes satisfying q|(p− 1), and g is an element of
multiplicative order q in Z∗p. These domain parameters must
be made known to the CEUA and RP in a reliable way, e.g.
by inclusion in a certificate signed by a trusted CA. The
CEUA and RP are required to know the actual value of the
claim prior to the protocol run, or at least know that it lies
within a small set of possible values (this can be achieved by
imposing a registration procedure between the user and the
RP prior to the protocol, whereby the user registers her/his
claim values that can later be asserted to this particular RP).
4.2 Protocol Steps
The following protocol (see [5, 10]) forms the basis of
the proposed solution.
1. IdP→ CEUA : s = g−c mod p [where c is the claim
value, and s is included in a security token].
2. CEUA→ RP : s, d = gr mod p [where r is a random
integer (1 6 r 6 q − 1) chosen by the CEUA].
3. RP→ CEUA : e [e is a random integer (1 6 e 6 2t)
chosen by the RP, and t is a security parameter].
4. CEUA→ RP : y = r + ec mod q
5. RP: if d = gyse mod p, then user authentication is
successful.
All the messages sent in the protocol above must be con-
veyed over a secure channel that protects both confiden-
tiality and integrity (e.g. an SSL/TLS channel). The pro-
tocol can easily be integrated with the currently deployed
CardSpace identity metasystem; no changes to the meta-
system are required. However, some minor changes must
be made to the framework and the way each party handles
the security tokens. Steps 1, 2 and 5 of the above protocol
should be integrated with steps 6, 7 and 8 respectively of
the message flow described in section 2.2. The value s will
be digitally signed by the IdP by including it within the se-
curity token (e.g. using an XML-signature within a SAML
assertion).
After the second step of the protocol above, the RP
knows that the IdP is asserting a claim c, from the inclu-
sion of s = g−c mod p in the token; if, moreover, the RP
knows in advance the expected value of c, then it can use
the received value s to verify whether the IdP is asserting
this expected value or not. Also, if the RP knows that c
lies within a certain small set of values, then the RP can de-
termine which is being asserted by a simple trial and error
process; however, if the set of possible values for c is very
large, then the RP does not learn anything about the asserted
claim. After the protocol has completed, and if user authen-
tication is successful, then the RP can grant the service to
the user. Not only does successful completion of the pro-
tocol mean that the IdP is asserting the claim regarding the
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user, but it also proves that the user knows the claim value
c, providing an additional layer of user authentication. Of
course, how strong this will be will depend on whether the
claim is readily guessable by a third party.
The protocol thus enables the IdP to assert a claim about
the user, and for the user to confirm knowledge of this claim,
without revealing the claim to the RP. This means that the
user does not need to trust the RP not to misuse a revealed
claim. Also note that the scheme has the advantage that it
does not require any additional key management.
In the case of self-issued tokens, there is no IdP in the
framework. The user must include the value s = g−c mod
p instead of the actual value of the claim in the security
token.
5 Analysis
In this section we provide a security and performance
analysis of the proposed solution.
5.1 Security Analysis
We believe that the above solution will enhance the over-
all security of the currently deployed CardSpace identity
metasystem. In this section we consider the security prop-
erties of the proposed scheme.
5.1.1 Addressing the CardSpace Security Limitations
In section 3 we discussed certain security limitations of the
CardSpace framework. In particular, we highlighted its re-
liance on the user’s judgement of the trustworthiness of the
RP, and on a single layer of authentication. We believe that
the proposed solution addresses both these security limita-
tions.
The scheme avoids the need to rely on the user’s judge-
ment of the trustworthiness of the RP, by avoiding the need
for initial trust between the user and the RP. In the revised
protocol, the user does not have to reveal personal informa-
tion to the RP. Instead, the user demonstrates knowledge of
this information.
Our solution does not rely on a single layer of authen-
tication. If the working session is hijacked (e.g. by com-
promising a self-issued token), or the user’s password is
cracked, the security of the whole system will not be totally
breached, since the solution adds a new layer of authentica-
tion. When trying to log-in to an RP, an attacker will not be
able to demonstrate the knowledge of the legitimate user’s
personal information, and hence that RP will not let the at-
tacker log in. Moreover, the attacker cannot learn the legit-
imate user’s personal information, since the actual value of
the claims will not be included in the security token.
5.1.2 Privacy
We believe that the proposed solution should increase the
privacy level of CardSpace users. As shown in section 4,
the values of claims are not revealed at any stage. Avoiding
the need to reveal the values of the claims is a significant
enhancement to the privacy of CardSpace.
Unlike the currently deployed CardSpace identity meta-
system, in the proposed solution the user does not have to
reveal to the IdP the identity of the RP. This should also
enhance the privacy of the users.
The solution implicitly assumes that the number of pos-
sible values for a claim c is greater than 2128. As a result,
it should be computationally infeasible for polynomially-
bounded adversary to deduce the value of c from the value
s (assuming that the Discrete Logarithm problem is difficult
[8]).
The proposed solution satisfies the requirements of law
2 of Microsoft’s own laws of identity to a greater degree
than the currently deployed CardSpace identity metasystem,
where law 2 states that only the minimum amount of iden-
tifying information must be revealed.
5.1.3 The Guessing Problem
Since that the proposed solution is based on disguising the
personal information of the users, there is always the risk
of an attacker guessing this information and breaking the
second layer of authentication the scheme provides. Some
claims can be guessed easily, especially for “user-oriented”
attacks where information about the user is already known
by the attacker. Examples of such claims include first
name, home country, age or marital status. In the proposed
solution, if an attacker successfully broke the CardSpace
first layer of authentication (which might, for example, be
password-based), then she/he can try to guess a particular
claim, and verify whether her/his guess is correct or not
even before forwarding the security token to the RP. This
can be done using the publicly known parameters p and g,
and the value s received at step 1 of the protocol-run.
We propose two solutions for this problem. The first so-
lution, which we recommend, is based on choosing “hard-
to-guess” claims by the RP to be asserted by the IdP, such
as a combination of a series of attributes, such as mother’s
maiden name, social security number and credit card num-
ber. Since the impact of a successful guessing attack would
be allowing an imposter user to log in to an RP, the RP
could protect itself by requesting claims that cannot be eas-
ily guessed. Many Internet service providers already rely on
“hard-to-guess” personal information to authenticate users
when they forget their passwords.
Another solution would be for the IdP to mask the value
c, e.g. by using the value c + x instead of c, where x is a
random value selected by the IdP. The value of x can then
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be shared with the RP by encrypting it using the RP public
key and inserting it into the security token. This solution
requires the user to reveal the identity of the RP to the IdP,
and this potentially violates user privacy.
Finally, there is a risk of a fake RP guessing the personal
information of the user and verifying the correctness of its
guesses using the publicly known parameters and the value
s. The first solution described above addresses this prob-
lem; the user can refuse to request an assertion for claims
that can be easily guessed.
5.1.4 Access to Claims by the CEUA
The proposed solution requires the CEUA to be aware of
the actual value of the claim in order to generate a response
message for the zero knowledge challenge message it re-
ceives from the RP. In some cases it is not realistic to ex-
pect users to memorise all of their registered claims values,
so that they can pass them to the CEUAwhen required. Cer-
tain claims can be hard to remember, such as a health record
number or a credit card number. Moreover, being required
to enter the actual values of the claims every time a user
logs in to a website might be extremely inconvenient.
We propose three solutions for this problem, although
each solution has certain drawbacks:
1. Storing the claims values on a trusted server: from
which the users can retrieve all of their registered
claims after being authenticated. This solution would
add more complexity to the framework.
2. Storing the claims values on a user token: Such a solu-
tion is potentially more reliable and less complex than
the first solution. Storing the claims on a user token,
such as USBmemory stick or smart card, would add an
authentication factor to the scheme, i.e. the possession
of the token. This solution is similar to the ID card
identification process used in the real world, where a
person needs to present an identification card in order
to be authenticated. The management and security of
the token is an issue here.
3. Retrieving the claims values directly from the IdP
by the CEUA: after authenticating the user, prior to
the step of requesting a security token. Such a pro-
cess would have to take place outside of the current
CardSpace framework. Applying this solution means
adding one more message to the framework and losing
the additional layer of authentication.
5.2 Performance Analysis
The proposed solution can readily be integrated with the
currently deployed CardSpace identity metasystem. Only
two steps need to be added to the framework described
in section 2; these two steps involve exchanging the zero-
knowledge-proof messages and should take place at the end
of the message flow. An additional step may be added when
adopting the third proposed solution to the problem of re-
trieving the claims values by the CEUA.
The proposed solution requires some minor changes to
the content of the security token, involving some inexpen-
sive computational operations (i.e. performing the calcula-
tions described in section 4.2 in the protocol-run). Apart
from that, the metasystem remains precisely the same (e.g.
the security token format, the message flow, etc.).
The shared parameters p, q and g can be changed fre-
quently if required, and the task of deploying these shared
parameters among the involved parties can be achieved us-
ing a number of simple methods. One method would be to
publish these parameters on the IdP website.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided an overview of the
CardSpace identity metasystem framework, and outlined
certain security limitations of this framework. We focused
on two security limitations, namely the reliance on the
user’s judgement on the trustworthiness of the RP, and the
reliance on a single layer of authentication.
We have proposed a solution to address these two se-
curity limitations. The proposed solution is based on ap-
plying the concept of Secured from Identity Theft (SIT) at-
tributes, based on Schnorr’s zero-knowledge protocol, to the
CardSpace identity metasystem framework. The proposed
solution may be vulnerable to guessing attacks; however,
we have proposed a variety of measures to mitigate the risk
of such attacks.
Finally, the proposed solution can readily be integrated
into the currently deployed CardSpace identity metasystem,
and only two (or three) steps need to be added to the frame-
work. The proposed solution requires some minor changes
to the content of the security token issued by the IdP, with
a few inexpensive computations to be performed by the in-
volved parties.
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